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SUMMARY
At the beginning of the 1990s, the World Bank introduced conditionalities to reform the forest concession regime in Central Africa and con-
tinuously intervened, inter alia, in Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and the DRC up to 2010. The reforms were designed to achieve two immediate 
objectives: (i) increase the price of the resource through competitive market procedures or, if inapplicable, through taxation, (ii) break down the 
patronage system that governed the forest permits allocation. These efforts have been supported by national reformers, and fought against by 
various vested interests such as the timber companies, but also officials in the forest departments. Because of the difficult political economy, 
reform ambitions have been lowered, and only a certain proportion of the policy measures initially contemplated has been implemented. This 
called for a completion of the reform agenda and fine tuning. But by the middle of the 2000s, the evolution of paradigms in tropical forestry 
gave the critics of the WB policy of concession reforms opportunities to challenge the orientations followed hitherto in Central Africa. The 2013 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report of the WB forestry policy, criticizing the WB’s management efforts to reform concession regimes 
in Africa, testified to this change of paradigm. The critics are of mixed mind, with community advocates favoring more pressure on the African 
governments to dismantle the concession regime and proponents of “performance-based aid” seeing REDD+ as an opportunity to withdraw 
from direct sectoral intervention. Paradoxically, in spite of REDD+ initiatives and rhetoric, forestry has tumbled in the national policy agendas 
and forest concessions or protected areas are encroached by agribusiness plantations and mines with the implicit support of large fractions 
within governments.
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Les tentatives de la Banque Mondiale pour réformer le régime des concessions forestières en 
Afrique centrale: les enseignements de 25 années d’efforts
A. KARSENTY
Au début des années 1990, la Banque Mondiale a utilisé des conditionnalités pour réformer le régime des concessions forestières en Afrique 
centrale et est resté active sur ce front notamment au Cameroun, Congo, Gabon et RDC jusqu’en 2010. Les réformes avaient deux objectifs 
immédiats: (i) accroître le prix payé pour la ressource boisée grâce à des procédures concurrentielles d’attribution ou, à défaut, par la fiscalité, 
(ii) en finir avec le système clientéliste qui dominait les processus d’attribution des titres forestiers. Ces efforts ont été soutenus par des 
réformateurs nationaux et combattus par différents groupes de pression, mais aussi par une partie des personnels des ministères en charge des 
forêts. Du fait de la complexité du contexte politique, les ambitions réformatrices ont dû être revues à la baisse, et une partie seulement 
des réformes projetées a pu être mise en œuvre. Ceci plaidait pour le parachèvement des réformes et l’amélioration continue des mesures 
introduites. Mais au milieu des années 2000, les changements dans les représentations au sujet des forêts tropicales ont donné aux critiques 
du système des concessions industrielles l’occasion de mettre directement en cause les actions menées par la Banque en Afrique centrale. Le 
rapport 2013 du «Groupe Indépendant d’Évaluation» de la Banque Mondiale (IEG) sur la politique forestière de l’institution, qui critiquait les 
efforts celle-ci pour réformer le régime des concessions en Afrique, témoigne de ces changements. Les avocats de la gestion communautaire 
insistent pour que la Banque fasse pression sur les gouvernements africains pour que ceux-ci démantèlent les concessions, tandis que les tenants 
d’une aide «basée sur les résultats» voient en REDD+ une occasion de se retirer des interventions directe dans le secteur forestier. Paradoxale-
ment, alors que se développaient des discours nationaux emphatiques sur REDD+, la foresterie a perdu du terrain dans les agendas politiques 
en Afrique centrale, et les plantations commerciales ainsi que les mines empiètent sur les concessions forestières et les aires protégées avec le 
soutien implicite de nombreux décideurs nationaux.
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had little involvement in the CAR forestry sector and almost 
none in Equatorial Guinea. 
The WB took a prominent role in the forestry dialogue and 
the reform processes in these five countries3, with more or less 
success. This strong involvement and its modalities can be 
attributed to the convictions of the then WB staff in charge of 
the sectoral operations for Central Africa. But it was facili-
tated by the “structural adjustment” plans of that period that 
gave the WB levers to orient the policy dialogue in certain 
directions, notably for reforming the system of concessions. 
With the end of the structural adjustment period, large por-
tions of these countries’ foreign debts were cancelled through 
the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) process toward 
the end the 2000s. Last, the emergence of REDD+ in the 
agenda, has completed the change in the manner the WB is 
conducting policy dialogues for the forest sector. 
These past endeavours to introduce reforms have been 
discussed in several documents, e.g., Brunner and Ekoko 
(2000), Ekoko (2000), Essama Nssah B. and Gockowski 
(2000), Carret (2000), Vincent et al. (2005), Karsenty (2006), 
Topa et al. (2009) for Cameroon. Less has been written on the 
DRC, except by Debroux et al. (2007). Greenpeace produced 
a few critical assessments on the WB intervention in Camer-
oon and the DRC (Greenpeace 2007, 2010). The WB policy 
Los intentos del Banco Mundial para reformar el sistema de concesiones forestales en África 
Central: lecciones de 25 años de esfuerzos
A. KARSENTY
A principios de los años 90, el Banco Mundial hizo uso del principio de condicionalida d para reformar el sistema de concesiones forestales en 
África Central, manteniéndose activo en esta línea en Camerún, Congo, Gabón y República Democrática del Congo hasta el año 2010. Las 
reformas tenían dos objetivos inmediatos (i) aumentar el precio pagado por los recursos forestales a través de procedimientos de licitación o, 
en su defecto, a través de impuestos, y (ii) poner fin al sistema clientelista que dominó el proceso de asignación de títulos forestales. Estos 
esfuerzos han sido apoyados por los reformistas nacionales y fueron combatidos por varios grupos de presión, así como por algunos de los 
empleados de los ministerios encargados de los bosques. Debido a la complejidad del contexto político, las ambiciones reformistas tuvieron 
que ser rebajadas, y sólo una parte de las reformas propuestas se vieron implementadas. Esta situación parecía abogar por rematar las reformas 
y la mejora continua de las medidas introducidas. Pero a mediados de la década de los 2000, los cambios en los paradigmas dominantes en 
torno a los bosques tropicales dieron a los críticos de las concesiones industriales la oportunidad de cuestionar las acciones del Banco en 
África Central. En el 2013, el informe del « Grupo Independiente de Evaluación « del Banco Mundial (IEG) sobre la política forestal de la 
institución, que criticó los esfuerzos para reformar el régimen de concesiones en África, refleja estos cambios: mientras los abogados de la 
gestión forestal comunitaria insistían en que el Banco presionara a los gobiernos africanos para que desmantelasen las concesiones industriales, 
los partidarios de una ayuda «basada en resultados» vieron en REDD + una oportunidad para abandonar la ayuda directa al sector forestal. 
Paradójicamente, mientras que los enfáticos discursos nacionales sobre REDD + han ido creciendo, la gestión forestal ha perdido terreno en las 
agendas políticas de África Central al tiempo que las plantaciones comerciales y la explotación minera invaden concesiones forestales y áreas 
protegidas con el apoyo implícito de muchas autoridades nacionales.
1
 The forest policy advice of the Bank to the government of Cameroon was formulated in the context of the 1987 Tropical Forestry Action Plan, 
the 1989 review of the agricultural sector, and subsequent Country Assistance Strategies. The preferred delivery instrument was a policy-
based lending program that started in 1989 (Essama Nssah B. and Gockowski 2000). In DRC, WB support to the forest reform agenda 
was channeled through various Bank instruments, notably the Economic Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Support Project 
(EESRP).
2
 A few forest economy studies agreed to by the WB and the Government of Congo took place in Congo, but did not translate into the reforms 
proposed by the consultants. In Gabon, the WB has been instrumental in helping the Minister of Finance recover unpaid forest taxes and 
allowing for the return of several dozens of permits to the public domain, but no significant reforms have been undertaken, except the 2010 
log export ban, decided without any interference by the WB (which would certainly have opposed the measure).
3
 Namely, Cameroon, the DRC, Congo (Rep. of), Gabon, and the Central African Republic. 
INTRODUCTION
Between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, important changes 
occurred in the regulatory frameworks of several forested 
Central Africa’s countries, in order to foster sustainable man-
agement of the forest resources and to increase transparency 
and co-benefits from the use of such resources. All the six 
forested countries (Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Gabon, CAR, 
and Equatorial Guinea) adopted new forest codes during the 
period, often supported and assisted by international organi-
zations. In some of the countries, the involvement of the 
World Bank (WB) in both the preparation and the implemen-
tation of new legal principles through the publication of 
decrees and “arrêtés (“Orders”), has been especially notice-
able, e.g., in Cameroon and the DRC, given the WB’s finan-
cial levers1 in these two countries through the attachment of 
“conditionalities” to critical loans and grants during negotia-
tions with these countries. By comparison, the Republic of 
Congo and Gabon, where WB interventions for introducing 
reforms has been tangible but without comparable financial 
levers, have not experienced the same relationship with 
the international institution in the forest sector. The WB 
approach’s footprints on the regulatory framework are less 
visible, even though they are not non-existent2. The Bank has 
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has also been assessed critically by two specialized bodies of 
the WB group itself: the Inspection Panel (IP) for the DRC 
(2007) and the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) (2013). 
Both the IP and the IEG reports thought ill of efforts to reform 
the concessions regime in Central Africa4, arguing that it was 
a way of perpetuating if not supporting this system rather than 
replacing it by an alternative regime based on community 
forestry, conservation initiatives and other ways of capitaliz-
ing the forest resource (through carbon storage, for instance). 
Actually, neither of these two reports examined the theoreti-
cal background that supported WB interventions in the 
forestry sector. The policy recommendations, which were 
explicit in the IP report and implicit in the IEG report, 
betrayed the a priori thinking and beliefs of their authors, and 
also their poor knowledge of the political economy of those 
countries. 
This article tries to shed light on the political economy 
context of the reforms conducted at the initiative of the WB in 
Cameroon and DRC between 1990 and 2010, and to explain 
the theoretical background of the WB intervention in the 
forestry sector. It takes stock of the reform process and its 
achievements, difficulties and limitations. This article also 
provides some background for explaining the changes in the 
modalities of the WB intervention in the forestry sector by the 
end of the 2000s decade and why it has been taken to task by 
its own Inspection Panel and its Internal Evaluation Group. 
Finally, it discusses the new context in which the intervention 
of donors (traditional ones such as the WB, or potential new-
comers such as Norway) is likely to take place. It recalls the 
ambition embodied into REDD+, i.e., to leave the countries 
fully responsible for designing and conducting appropriate 
policies to curb deforestation, and to pay for the “perfor-
mance” achieved. It argues that such an approach will turn out 
to be an illusion in countries with limited capacities and weak 
institutions. New policy approaches informed by the lessons 
of reform experiences in Central Africa, need to be promoted 
to shift from public national forest policies to forest-related 
policies.
THE SITUATION OF THE FOREST SECTOR IN THE 
EARLY 1990S IN CENTRAL AFRICA: A “RENTIER” 
SYSTEM BASED ON ECONOMIC EXTRAVERSION 
AND LAND RIGHTS ALLOCATION
The forest landscapes of Central Africa are characterized by 
low population densities, often below 2–3 inhabitants per 
square km. In an article called “La dialectique du vide”, the 
geographer Roland Pourtier (1986) insisted on the impact of 
such phenomena on the perception of space and social orga-
nization. He dwelled especially on the blurred boundaries of 
the terroirs used by local communities. Land tenure is seen, 
therefore, as recognition of the effort devoted to clearing the 
land rather than ownership as is usually the case in Western 
conceptions. The land is not scarce, but the labour is, espe-
cially in local societies composed of relatively small villages 
that cannot easily mobilize large working forces for collective 
tasks. As Vermeulen (2000) also pointed out, conflicts within 
communities often lead to separation and the creation of new 
villages, since there were limited pressures on lands before.
On the other hand, forested countries of Central Africa5 
enjoy abundant natural resources, such as oil (Gabon, Congo, 
Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea), minerals (DRC and CAR, 
but also Congo and Cameroon) and timber. These assets, in 
countries with low education performances and weak institu-
tions, tend to bring the economy of the region close to what 
economists call “the resource curse”: extraversion of the 
export-based economy (raw material), under-development of 
agriculture, policy priority given to urban populations, and 
high social inequalities. 
Ecological heterogeneity and high costs of resource 
mobilization means highly selective harvests
Forestry in Central Africa has been shaped by both the eco-
logical characteristics of the forest and the economic features. 
Harvests are very selective (“high-grading”) and concentrated 
on a handful of species: those whose commercial value is high 
enough to bear, notably, the high transport and handling costs 
incurred by the weak, poorly managed infrastructures. Given 
the spatial heterogeneity of the species, the volume harvested 
are, on average (with some exceptions when the commercial 
species are concentrated), around 8–12 m3/ha – and even as 
low as 3–4 m3 in the hinterland of the DRC. As a result, the 
concessions tend to be large, with some in Congo and the 
DRC bigger than one million hectares. Around 50 million 
hectares are in the concessions (around 26% of the moist 
forest area) (De Wasseige et al. 2009). 
The commercial harvest per surface unit is very limited 
compared to what is harvested in dense forests in South-East 
Asia. Industrial logging is rarely a direct factor of deforesta-
tion in Central Africa. There is no correlation between the 
importance of the forest industry and deforestation: Gabon 
used to have the largest timber industry, with up to 3.2 million 
m3 extracted per year less than a decade ago, and it is also a 
country with one of the lowest rates of deforestation (less than 
0.1% of gross deforestation). Conversely, population density 
is closely correlated with deforestation. As pointed out by 
Defourny et al. (2011) for the DRC, “the presence of a 
logging concession and a mining permit does not seem to play 
a role in deforestation/degradation, at least at the national 
and sub-national scales studied” and “. . . it is above all the 
importance of the on-site population which determine the 
quantity of forest affected by deforestation and degradation. 
These very clear results contradict several studies, more 
local-oriented, which often emphasized the distance to roads 
and the importance of the flux associated with roads as the 
first cause of deforestation”.
4
 The IP report was only on the DRC. The IEG report was a worldwide evaluation of the intervention of the WB in the forest sector, but the 
criticisms focused on the work to reform the system of concessions in Central Africa and Liberia.
5
 This excludes Chad, Burundi and Rwanda.
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this pattern has changed over time: most of the timber is 
locally processed and low quality logs make up the bulk of 
the log exports (for China and India). The industry hardly 
produces for the domestic market – which is supplied almost 
exclusively by the informal sector.
The high cost of labour is partly linked to the fixed 
exchange rate between the CFA Franc and the Euro, and, 
for the DRC which has its own currency, to the cost of life. 
Coupled with the lack of trained workers and various logisti-
cal difficulties, this has been the rationale for the exportation 
of logs for decades. The governments’ log export bans have 
modified this marketing pattern in Gabon and Cameroon, but 
has done less well in the Republic of Congo. On the other 
hand, the successive crises that struck the local populations 
put the industrial products beyond their financial reach, espe-
cially since the products were made more expensive because 
of more norms and taxes. Chainsaw loggers gradually 
replaced the formal industry as domestic suppliers. Now 
From an ecological perspective, the “creaming” of the 
timber species may have negative impacts: overexploitation 
of certain species, whilst other species, sometime abundant 
ones like the Fraké (Terminalia superba) in Cameroon, could 
be harvested more to supply the industry, without jeopardis-
ing their regeneration (Fredericksen and Putz 2003). Cream-
ing would entail changes in the composition of the forest that 
could deplete the commercial value of future harvests (if the 
market demand targets the same given species over time).
Greater preference for raw material than for local 
processing
The other characteristic of Central African countries in the 
1990s was the predominance of exports of logs6. Typically, 
the better quality of timber was exported as raw material, 
while the lower quality was processed locally, partly for 
export, but also for local consumption. It is striking to see how 
FIGURE 1 Density of population in the Congo Basin
Source: Based on data from Revenga C., Nackoney J., Hoshino E., Kura, Y., and Maidens, J. 2003. Watersheds of the World. IUCN, 
International Water Management Institute, Ramsar Convention Bureau, WRI. Washington, DC: WRI.
6
 This has not been the case for all periods. For instance, in Cameroon in 1952, during the colonial era, the production of logs was 257,000 m3 
of which 71,000 were exported as logs and 186,000 processed locally (Source: Perraudin R., “Des ressources forestières mal exploitées” in 
Marchés Tropicaux, special issue on Cameroon, January 1953. 
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the informal sector is producing more and more while the 
industrial sector is on the decline.
Low population density and abundant natural resources: 
the rationale for the concessions regime
For land-locked and low-populated countries such as Central 
African Republic (CAR), Northern Congo and most part 
of DRC, the rationale for large-scale concessions was clear. 
History, which shapes the collective preferences of local 
inhabitants, also matters. With a limited tradition of local 
self-organization for economic development, the collective 
preferences have favoured a bargaining-dependent relation-
ship with the concession permit holder rather than unlikely 
community development externally promoted7. On the other 
hand, the delivery of local public goods by foreign large-scale 
companies that are requested to replace an absent government 
cannot be seen as a sustainable and desirable model, since it 
can turn out to be an obstacle to the development of local and 
accountable representation schemes, especially public ones 
(elected local councils, etc.).
Land tenure is generally featured as “dual”, with opposi-
tion between the State monopoly or ownership of land and 
resources, and the customary practices which allow the “land 
master” to allocate plots of land to newcomers who are guar-
anteed traditional family property rights over the cleared land, 
as long as the plot is cultivated. But another duality is even 
more important: the overlapping between community lands 
and forest concessions. Such overlaps are manageable since 
they are usually not mutually exclusive: land reserved for 
populations, timber for concessionaires (see Lescuyer et al. 
2012). But there are also cases where trees are the subject of 
competition between concessionaires and populations: Moabi 
(Baillonella toxisperma) trees for seed oil and bark, Sapele 
(Entandrophragma cylindricum) trees for caterpillars. Yet, 
community claims for an economic autonomy are limited. 
Greater autonomy would be difficult to sustain, given the 
limited access to markets, credit and affordable transport. 
The relationships with concessionaires are ambiguous: on the 
one hand, logging activity creates trouble for hunting, crop-
farming and so forth, but on the other hand, local communi-
ties see concessions as opportunities for employment, and for 
bargaining (various “compensations” are expected or claimed).
A discretionary allocation system at the core of the 
patronage system and politicians games: high private 
transfers and low public revenues
The core of the “rentier” system has always been the alloca-
tion system for concessions (whether for forestry, mining or 
agriculture). In some cases, the allocation was granted through 
a commission – or bidding – which made the decision 
processes opaque and plagued by corruption. After this point 
was raised in several WB documents in the 1990s concerning 
Central Africa (Grut et al. 1991), designing a transparent 
and competitive allocation system became a priority for the 
“conditionalities” set by the Bank for disbursing loans and 
cancelling debts. 
The taxation system was also subject to scrutiny. Most 
of the tax collected was for the export of logs; the royalties 
proportional to the surface granted in concessions were inex-
istent or very low. This configuration was adapted to a discon-
tinuous activity, characterized by “stop-and-go” phases, 
where taxes were due only when the timber was sold and 
exported. On the other hand, it was considered to encourage 
waste, “creaming” and the holding of huge areas by conces-
sionaires at the expense of other potential uses or tenure (Grut 
et al. 1991; Gray 2002). In the DRC, at the beginning of the 
2000s, more than 40 million hectares were held by conces-
sionaires, but the country was only exporting 100,000 m3, 
meaning that most of these concessions were not exploited (at 
least for timber) (Debroux et al. 2007).
Public revenue from the timber trade was low, compared 
to what could have reasonably been expected for an activity 
spread over such large areas. In Cameroon, revenue amounted 
to $7.1 million in 1993, and for the DRC, the forest revenue 
was only around $100,000 in the early 2000s. This did not 
mean that the concessionaires had no “tax-like” costs: corrup-
tion costs were – and still are – significant and many “parafis-
cal” contributions requested by various administrations and 
bodies for their own sake, put a strain on companies’ budgets. 
In sum, companies pay almost all the time to myriad of 
bodies, but only a tiny part of this money reaches the public 
treasury (see CIRAD & ID 2004, for DRC, and Cerutti et al. 
2012, for Cameroon).
THE WORLD BANK INTERVENTION IN CAMEROON
Cameroon, by the end of the 1990s, was a country with high 
debts and serious cash flow problems. The country went into 
a quite brutal process of “structural adjustment”, with severe 
cuts in public expenditures and civil servant wages. Many of 
the civil servants were dismissed (people coined an ironic 
term saying that the civil service was “déflatés”) in the early 
1990s. Financial and technical assistance from the WB and 
the IMF had been granted, on the condition that reforms 
would be introduced in various sectors8. These “conditionali-
ties” triggered for the reform of the forest sector in Cameroon, 
which will inspirit eventually similar processes in some of the 
neighbouring countries.
7
 There is a significant difference with the situation frequently recorded in Latin America, where indigenous populations frequently make 
territorial claims.
8
 Between 1990 and 1998 no forest-related lending took place. The Bank used various opportunities to maintain forest issues in the overall 
policy dialogue with the Government and in the discussions that accompanied the preparation of Structural Adjustment Credits I and II (Topa 
et al. 2009).
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A diagnosis formulated in economic terms
During the 1980s and 1990s, there were several very active 
schools of thought on natural resources management, espe-
cially on timber. Economists such as Malcolm Gillis, David 
Repetto, Jeffrey Vincent, John Gray and William Hyde, 
amongst others, wrote several influential papers on the 
economics of forest concessions. Most of the analyses were 
derived from Malaysia and Indonesia where forest resources 
had been rapidly depleted whilst concessionaires enjoyed 
high profits. For West and Central Africa, a report by Grut 
et al. (1991) prepared for the WB, carried these analyses 
further and formulated policy recommendations which were 
to have a strong influence of the WB’s work in Central Africa. 
The “underpricing” of timber resource, thanks to an 
unbalanced fiscal structure (taxes on exported wood rather 
than on the volume cut or the surface granted), was consid-
ered as a source of waste and inefficiency affecting the entire 
value chain. It was also deemed as being a transfer of the 
economic rent to the concessionaires at the expense of 
the public treasury. Such underpricing was attributed to the 
structure of the fiscal system, but also to the discretionary 
allocation system that prevented transparent and fair competi-
tion. Competition could be a tool for showing willingness to 
pay the loggers to access the resource, as was later revealed in 
Cameroon (Topa et al. 2009). Focusing on bringing competi-
tion into the allocation system was considered as an opportu-
nity to kill two birds with one stone: raise the stumpage value 
of commercial timber and introducing transparency and fair-
ness into an opaque mechanism. Efficiency and governance 
could, then, go hand in hand. In addition, the expected higher 
fiscal revenue could be shared between the central govern-
ment and the local governments: in Cameroon, the reform 
entitled local councils on whose territory the logging was 
taking place to 40% of the area fee (set through auctioning) 
and 10% was granted to the neighbouring communities.
The reform in Cameroon was prepared in the early 1990s 
by a mixed team composed of high profile officials from 
various ministries, WB staff, and consultants. An important 
document on forest policy was published in 1992 by the 
Cameroonian government. It summed up one year of discus-
sions by the mixed team, and set out much of the content of 
the 1994 forestry law. This law, thus, was not “imposed” by 
the WB on the Cameroonian government, as is often believed. 
But the small number of Cameroonian civil servants involved 
in the process suggests that the “ownership” of the process 
was too limited. Ekoko and Brunner (2000) mentioned the 
absence of implication of the Parliament’s Representatives 
which eventually led to the Parliament’s eliminating a number 
of items previously agreed upon with the Bank and adopting 
unwelcome (from the WB and the Government’s perspective) 
amendments to the Forestry Law (such as the introduction of 
a log export ban). In fact, at the onset of the reform process, 
members of Parliament (with many of them involved in 
forestry activities) were keener on defending their own privi-
leges than advocating on behalf of the national economy, the 
environment and the interests of the rural population. Local 
NGOs, although mentioned as major stakeholders in the 
WB policy documents, did not participate in the discussions, 
and no real efforts were made to explain the orientations 
afterwards: the Bank staff was perhaps convinced they would 
welcome the Bank’s effort to promote better governance, 
community forestry and a better fiscal system in a way that 
would benefit the local councils and the communities.
Cameroon has been a laboratory for introducing an 
auction system for forest permits that is unique in tropical 
forestry9. The principle was to auction an annual fee based on 
the area conceded10. The negotiations with the Government 
led the WB to a concession that seemed minor at the time but 
turned out to be critical later on: the combination of “techni-
cal criteria” with the financial offer for assessing the bids. The 
WB managed to have the financial offer account for 70% 
of the total, and the technical proposal for only 30%. But 
the technical proposal did not only have the disadvantage 
of being assessed on a “subjective basis” (with the risk of 
corruption of the commission members) that distorted 
competition; a too low score could also disqualify the tender. 
This eliminatory threshold was overused in several cases to 
eliminate competition and allow a bidder to remain the only 
one on the list. . .
The second part of the agenda: community forestry, 
independent watching and SFM
The institutionalization of “community forests” (with a legal 
status) was also innovative in Central Africa. This agenda 
was pushed notably by IUCN, and received the support of the 
WB which shared the idea with the group of Cameroonian 
reformers in the mixed commission, in spite of the reluctance 
of the majority of the staff in the ministry in charge of 
forestry. Unlike it is sometimes considered, this was not a 
contingent objective of the WB in Central Africa, but it was 
conceived as the second step in a sequential dynamic of 
reforms. For WB staff involved in the process, no community 
forestry effort would have been possible or conceivable at the 
margin of an all-powerful, unregulated forest industry.
The community forests (CFs) were limited to a maximum 
of 5,000 ha, and the Ministry of Forestry obtained a modifica-
tion in the draft law that excluded the community forests from 
the future Permanent Forest Estate (PFE), in spite of the legal 
 9
 The auctions systems introduced in Peru and Bolivia has been limited, biased, and cannot really compare with the one introduced in 
Cameroon where some genuine competitive auctions took place (see Karsenty 2010).
10
 The first idea was to index the fee on the potential value of the timber stock, but it turned out to be impossible: inventories precise enough 
to set this value are only undertaken after the concession has been granted, never prior to allocation.
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requirement to draw up a (simplified) management plan that 
would guarantee long-term forestry use for the CFs11. Since 
the highest quality forests were located in zones planned to be 
gazetted (to be included in the PFE12), community forests 
have often been located in less rich forests.
Many other policy orientations have also been promoted: 
compulsory management plans for concessions and protected 
areas, reorganization of the institutions involved in forest 
supervision and plantations, etc. The achievements in terms 
of disclosure of public information, transparency and 
accountability have been quite impressive (Topa et al. 2009). 
The most salient one is probably the institutionalization of 
independent watching for forest permits allocation. It was 
rounded out by the introduction on independent monitoring 
of forest infractions. The last innovation took place first in 
Cameroon and was implemented later in Congo and DRC, 
with the hiring of a specialized body, Resources Extraction 
Monitoring (REM) (which replaced Global Witness in 
Cameroon as “watchdog”). But, to be a driver of changes, the 
information has to be used by the authorities. In Cameroon, 
the report of the independent observer of permits allocation 
mattered in the first years, but it gradually ceased to be used 
in the dialogue between the Government and the donors. As 
for the independent monitoring of forest infractions, with all 
the reports available on the Internet, they did not trigger the 
changes and the sanctions that could have been expected – 
probably because of the diminishing interest in the forestry 
reform processes during 2000s. 
A holistic view of the reform processes and their institu-
tional implications helps to explain why the Bank – at least 
the forestry team – was seeing the forestry sector, and espe-
cially the reform of the concessions system, as an entry point 
for improving governance in Central Africa, beyond the 
forestry sector itself (see also Brown et al. 2002). 
AN UNFINISHED AND CONTROVERTED REFORM 
PROCESS
The reform process in Cameroon has never been such as the 
WB staff envisioned initially. The 1994 Forest Law was not 
enforced until 1998, primarily because of lack of political 
will. This was illustrated in 1996 by the discretionary award-
ing of 6 concessions; this act infringed the 1994 law that 
stated that all concessions had to be allocated through a public 
auctioning system. In spite of assurances to the Bank that 
these cases would remain the exception, the first concessions 
award in 1997 was fraught with irregularities. This showed 
that, despite apparent transparency and political willingness, 
practices had not changed (Ongolo 2015). Until 1998, neither 
the Bank nor Cameroon had defined adequate legal and 
regulatory instruments to carry out the forest sector reforms 
(Topa et al. 2009).
The allocation system criticized and circumvented
A second round of reforms took place towards the end of the 
1990s, with conditionalities tied to the SAC III loan. A fiscal 
reform that also addressed the allocation system has been 
prepared and partially implemented. After long, tense dis-
cussions the Government finally accepted an independent 
observer (a Cameroonian citizen) of the allocation process. 
Allocation rounds in 2000 and 2001 were well organized, 
with financial offers surprisingly high, reflecting genuine 
competition to access the concessions13. But a “learning pro-
cess” took place in the aftermath; companies in cahoots with 
corrupt civil servants took advantage of the loopholes in the 
allocation process (eliminatory threshold linked to “technical 
criteria”, etc.) to eliminate genuine competition in most of the 
subsequent allocation rounds. In 2005, the allocation was 
clearly biased, with, in most cases, one competitor remaining 
listed for a concession and with unusually (suspiciously) low 
financial offers (CIRAD 2006).
But when the competition was effective, questions were 
raised about a potential “winner’s curse” (Vincent et al. 2005). 
The long-term commitment (15 years) for the annual area fee 
(a fixed cost) had to be compared with the annual volatility of 
the timber market, and the risk a high financial offer would 
entail for the winning bidder. This triggered criticism from 
the industry associations, relayed by the French and German 
governments whose timber companies had vested interests in 
the sector14. There are measures that could be adopted for 
mitigating this risk, such as indexing the area fees on the 
export price of timber, but such proposals are still part of the 
“unfinished agenda”, along with many other measures for 
“fine tuning” the regulatory framework (Topa et al. 2009).
Community forestry: the great disappointment
Community forests in Cameroon, which covered over 1.5 
million ha in 2011 (Cuny 2011), have been plagued by the 
“elite capture” phenomenon, a phenomenon facilitated by 
cumbersome, costly red-tape connected to the creation and 
functioning of community forests. Since 2005 the CFs, like 
the industrial concessions, have been subject to an Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA) study before being accepted. 
11
 The idea was, for the then Director of Forests, to extend the sphere of influence of the forestry administration beyond the PFE and to take 
over areas that otherwise would have been supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture (Source: conversation between M. N’Koulou, then 
Director of Forests, and the author in 1995).
12
 The zoning plan for the southern part of Cameroon started in the early 1990s, defined vocational zones, and made proposals for land-use 
allocation, but gazetting was required to create legal status and the PFE by law.
13
 The floor price for the area tax was around $2 in 2000 and the industry claimed it was too high. The average financial offers for the 2000 
and 2001 round were, in average, 4 times higher, with some offers 8 times above the floor price.
14
 Expressed by French and German government representatives at the meeting of the Board of the World Bank in 2002.
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(Cerruti and Lescuyer 2011). Some chainsaw lumber opera-
tors are collecting their timber in village fallowlands, while 
others in this informal production circuit who are better 
equipped have a “small title”, a category that is hardly con-
trolled and is known for being a pillar of illegal logging (REM 
2010). 
The World Bank has always been queasy about “small 
titles”, calling for more stringent regulations but at the same 
time wanting to keep them for the benefit of Cameroonians 
and to facilitate the development of small-scale enterprises, 
especially in the Community Forests. Globally, the WB has 
overlooked the “informalization” of the forest sector, and has 
been uneasy in its efforts to formulate appropriate policy 
responses (beyond the usual calls to “formalize the informal” 
and remove the red tape that strangles small and medium 
enterprises). 
A Permanent Forest Estate still virtual
Cameroon is one of the rare countries of the sub region with 
a zoning plan covering most of its dense forest areas. This 
could have been the basis for the decision to limit the size of 
the PFE and would have given a clear sign of the will to keep 
forest-related uses restricted to around 14 million hectares. 
The gazetting process, which provides the legal basis for 
granting legal status (PFE) to a mere proposal (the zoning 
plan), has required two decades. But, except for the protected, 
previously gazetted, areas, none of the Prime Ministers ever 
signed decrees for completing the gazetting of around 7 mil-
lion hectares of production forests (with concessions already 
granted). This part of the government wants to keep the future 
land use options open. The WB did not consider this issue 
extremely seriously until around 2010 when authorisations 
The EIA study costs around US$13,000 to which the com-
munity is to add around $15,000 as an upfront investment 
before any forest exploitation (Julve et al. 2007). This type 
of unrealistic requirement paved the way to greater growth in 
the informal sector and prevented the CFs from becoming 
competitive on the national market.
Cerutti and Lescuyer (2010) showed that chainsaw log-
ging was more profitable than small-scale enterprises operat-
ing within community forests. CFs have been used by corrupt 
officials, in cahoots with illegal loggers for “laundering” 
illegally exploited timber. The international partners who at 
one point actively backed the community forestry experience 
in Cameroon (such as the DFID and the GTZ/GIZ) gradually 
withdrew their support. 
The expansion of the informal sector
The economic crisis that hit the Cameroonian population, 
especially as of 1992 (cut in public and social expenses) and 
in 1994 (CFA devaluation), has led to growing informality in 
economic relationships. The “structural adjustments plans” 
piloted by the IMF and the WB also contributed to this 
phenomenon: impoverished citizens turned entirely to the 
chainsaw lumber operators to buy the timber they needed 
for construction work. The table below shows the evolution 
between 1980 and 2004. In the 1980s, exports (expressed 
as roundwood equivalents) were significantly less than 
registered production, meaning a large share of the domestic 
markets was supplied by the formal production sector. This 
share diminished slightly in the 1990s and at the end of the 
decade, exports even surpassed registered production!15
The current volume produced by the informal sector is 
comparable to the volume produced by the industrial sector 
Source: author
FIGURE 2 Comparison between registered (official) production and registered exports (converted into roundwood equivalents) 
from 1980 to 2004
15
 This is partly due to the shortcomings in the government’s information system during the last period. Industrial production figures were not 
entered into the information system. However, some of the exports are probably illegal.
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Nevertheless, coupled with other regulatory measures, 
25.5 million ha were returned to the public domain in 2002, 
and the attribution of new concessions was suspended 
(Debroux et al. 2007) through a moratorium that was to 
remain in force until the completion of a new regulatory 
framework. . . that still does not exist. The moratorium was to 
be circumvented repeatedly by the new minister of forests 
(appointed as of 2003), and millions of hectares were allo-
cated illegally. A “conversion process” of all the concessions 
was launched in 2006 and applied for a few years, with the 
aim to legalize concessions allocated according to the law. 
This participatory process was satisfying, but the results have 
been a foreseeable compromise between the rule of law and 
the vested economic interests. And last minute conversions 
even occurred after the completion of the process, a situation 
sharply denounced by international NGOs (RainForest 
Foundation Norway & UK, Greenpeace, Global Witness 
2009). Around 12 million ha of concession are now legally 
attributed in DRC, but the exact situation in the field remains 
unclear.
A new forest code was promulgated in 2002. It includes 
provisions for allocating the concessions through a competi-
tive process (but with exceptions!) and paves the way for 
major development of community forestry. The code also 
aims to have forest rent shared more equitably with local 
governments and local communities. In many respects, this 
new code can be compared with the 1994 Cameroonian law, 
and has provided opportunities for in-depth reform of the 
practices in the sector. But most of its provisions have still 
not been implemented, especially those related to community 
forestry: the decree has been in the governmental pipeline for 
5 years and issued only in 2014.
In DRC, thanks to the experience gained in Cameroon, 
the WB worked more effectively with civil society, Parlia-
mentarians, the private sector, civil society advocates and 
environmental NGOs. The difficulties came with some of 
these latter. The DRC has been highly invested – more than in 
Cameroon – by a few international NGOs, such as RainForest 
Foundation, that are opposed to logging16. Such organizations 
established strong links with the emerging civil society, 
providing them with access to Medias, international fora and 
financial support. Their agenda is to avoid the development 
of industrial logging in the DRC and to promote community 
forestry instead. 
The zoning plan was, like in Cameroon, supposed to be 
one of the pillars of the reform in DRC. But the World Bank 
faced criticisms from Congolese NGOs who denounced the 
risk of a top-down exercise resulting in the marginalization of 
the local communities and indigenous people. Hence the 
Bank decided to defer the zoning plan experiment after it had 
been planned, in order to concentrate on other issues seen as 
urgent priorities, such as breaches of the moratorium. This 
decision eventually landed the WB team in hot water.
for large-scale oil palm plantations and mining permits were 
granted on the virtual PFE. The WB, nonetheless, insisted for 
the gazetting decrees being signed, and used notably the lever 
of the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) initiative nego-
tiation in 2010–2011, with only partial success (Ongolo and 
Karsenty 2015).
DRC: THE UNLIKELY DUPLICATION
Beyond Cameroon, the other country where the WB had 
a strong lever for fostering reforms was the DRC. Years of 
civil war exhausted this country. After 2000, the new govern-
ment solicited external assistance for rebuilding the country. 
It was, for the WB, a unique opportunity to reshape the 
forest sector of one of the largest tropical forests in the world 
(around 140–150 million ha including dry forests and other 
woodlands). The same WB team that was involved in the 
Cameroonian reform started working in 2001 to design a new 
regulatory framework and governance system for the forestry 
sector in the DRC. But the difficulties were to be very 
significant, proportional to the size and the complexity of the 
country. While there were similarities, the WB work done in 
DRC and Cameroon were different. The similarities stem 
from the application of key principles (transparency, good 
governance fiscal accountability, sustainability, benefit 
sharing, and fight against corruption). The differences with 
Cameroon related to the fact that, in the DRC, WB forestry 
assistance was part of a broader re-engagement post-conflict 
intervention which had to address head-on the legacy of many 
years of war, destruction, lawlessness and institutional vacu-
um. This included primarily addressing a situation where 
most of the productive forests had been arbitrarily assigned 
to title holders in exchange for political support and other 
favours.
Overestimation of government capacity and sustained 
will to reform
One of the first measures pushed by the WB, when starting its 
forest cooperation with the DRC government, has been to 
help the government to return into the public domain millions 
of hectares of concessions that had been granted in the past. 
On 43.5 million hectares allocated in 2002, numerous conces-
sions totalling 35 million hectares were inactive and kept by 
their owners only for speculation. (Debroux et al. 2007). One 
of the instruments for returning these concessions back to the 
public domain, was the tentative introduction of an annual 
area fee of $0.5 per ha in 2002. This endeavour immediately 
spurred opposition from the forest industry (a dozen active 
companies), whose members owned concessions, some with 
surfaces over one million ha. A more gradual change in the 
fiscal system was adopted as of 2004. 
16
 In fact, the NGO sector displayed various degrees or support to the WB and only the NGOs mentioned were unwaveringly critical. Support 
was strongest from those NGOs with staff in the field. These included not only well known organizations, such as WWF, IUCN and WCS, 
but also smaller national NGOs.
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implementation has been extremely limited. Nonetheless, this 
statement reveals the beliefs of the IP members: for them, 
there was a tangible alternative to the concessions system, 
namely “sustainable use of forests” that was not explored 
by the WB team and could be achieved through community 
forestry.
This IP agenda is expressed clearly in the conclusion 
of the report: “the Panel notes the potential importance of 
developing a more balanced approach by emphasizing 
appropriate models of community forests as well as other 
actions to support community participation, land tenure and 
use rights in the forests and by linking to the recently pro-
posed Bank administered fund [the FCPF] to pilot instruments 
for reducing carbon emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation [REDD]”. This IP report blaming the WB man-
agement has had a considerable impact on the modalities of 
WB interventions in Central Africa. Actually, it marked a 
turning point in the involvement of the WB in the reforms of 
the forests sector. The WB became increasingly risk-adverse, 
and the Central Africa forest policy work was seen as overly 
complex and prone to reputational exposure.
A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: END OF DEBT 
DEPENDENCE, NEW INVESTORS AND 
“EMERGENCE” AMBITION
The loss of the usual levers: from debt reimbursement 
to investment 
The change in the WB intervention methods is also due to the 
end of the levering effects of debt restructuration. By 2010, 
the HIPC process had been completed for most of the Central 
African countries. The “conditionalities” that fostered the 
reforms in the forest sector are now obsolete. Since the 
Central African countries are no longer indebted, and their 
annual growth rates are high thanks to the rise of oil and 
mineral prices, and new investors from emerging countries 
(notably China) are knocking at their door so they care far less 
about the WB and the traditional donors. The Bank now seeks 
to invest in large sectoral or multisectoral programs such as 
the forest sector’s “Forest-Environment programs”. Making 
disbursements, however, is proving to be extremely difficult 
due to the inability of the governments to assure the condi-
tions for the correct use and investment of aid money. 
In Cameroon, during the 2008–2009 economic crisis, 
which had a severe impact on timber exports, the government 
negotiated emergency measures, such as suspending area 
17
 The Inspection Panel is an independent accountability mechanism of the WB. It was established in 1993. The Panel provides a forum for 
people who believe that they may be adversely affected by Bank-financed operations to bring their concerns to the highest decision-making 
levels of the World Bank. The Panel determines whether the Bank is complying with its own policies and procedures which are designed to 
ensure that Bank-financed operations provide social and environmental benefits and avoid harm to people and the environment.
18
 IPN request RQ05/2, December 1, 2005.
19
 In reality, it is common for zoning plans to be undertaken with properties already occupying the lands. In Cameroon, forest zoning affected 
forest areas with numerous concessions (and it took this situation into account). When the gazetting operations eventually took place in 
Cameroon, concession boundaries were often moved to satisfy the claims of communities anxious to develop their own lands. But, the IP 
had an opportunity to exploit this weakness in the WB team work. 
The Inspection Panel report: the end of WB active 
involvement in the reform processes
Between 1990 and 2005, the global agenda on tropical for-
estry has evolved significantly. New topics moved to the top 
of the agenda, pushing aside the former concerns about how 
to regulate concessions in order they deliver sustainable forest 
management and public revenue. Carbon emissions, illegal 
logging, and indigenous people: the three “big issues” of 
today were hardly addressed in the 1990s. The issues dis-
cussed in publications and at international conferences and 
the financial flows have changed in a manner that will impact 
the WB itself, especially at headquarters. 
At the end of 2005, the WB Inspection Panel (IP)17 
received a request from the “Organisations Autochtones 
Pygmées et Accompagnant les Autochtones Pygmées en 
République Démocratique du Congo”. The requesters claimed 
“that they have been harmed and will be harmed by the for-
estry sector reform activities supported by the [WB] Projects, 
which includes a plan for zoning the forests and, they fear, 
the implementation of a new commercial forest concession 
system”. The request was written in English18 and it is obvious 
that the whole process was orchestrated by at least one inter-
national NGOs. The final IP report, which was published 
in 2007, blamed the WB management for having neglected 
several safeguards related to indigenous people and environ-
mental assessments (Inspection Panel, 2007). The report 
exploited a strategic error of the WB related to the pilot zon-
ing plan mentioned above: the WB had dropped the plan. 
Since the “conversion process”, set up as a response to the 
breach of the moratorium by the ministry of forests, was 
meant to legalize the concessions granted on a regular basis, 
the Panel noted that “in this context, the forest concession 
conversion process serves as de facto zoning”19. 
Another criticism focused on the potential for levying 
forest taxes for the benefit of the State and the local govern-
ments. The IP pointed out that the WB “provided estimates of 
export revenue from logging concessions that turned out to be 
much too high. This had a significant effect, for it encouraged 
a focus on reform of the forest concession system at the 
expense of pursuing sustainable use of forests, the potential 
for community forests, and conservation”. The estimates pro-
vided by the WB came from the 2003 “Economic and Fiscal 
Review” (CIRAD and I&D, 2004). The revenue projections 
were attached to what turned out to be in retrospect a quite 
optimistic scenario in which the changes embodied in the new 
forest law would have been reasonably implemented. But 
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fees, directly with the industry. The WB was left out of the 
negotiations. The Bank is no longer a driver of change in the 
forest sector. In 2009 when the President of Gabon imposed a 
log export ban – which was fully enforced in 2010 – the Bank, 
admittedly seldom influential in Gabon, was not consulted.
The decline of the traditional forest industry and the 
rise of Asian investors in land business
Globally, industrial timber production in Central Africa has 
shrunk. The conjunction of higher taxes, escalating costs and 
log export bans (fully enforced or not) has squeezed the level 
of profits in the sector, at least for those who comply globally 
with the legal rules. The growing scarcity of high quality logs 
within some traditional species has created many more diffi-
culties for the European operators than for Asian concession-
aires who are looking for lower quality logs and can cope 
more easily with lesser known species.
The forest industry in Central Africa countries has, in the 
meantime, significantly evolved. Many European companies, 
once prominent, have been taken over by Asian ones (China 
or Malaysia). The industry split into four groups: (i) those 
who export mainly to Western Europe and have gotten or 
sought to get a FSC certification (7 companies on 5.5 million 
ha), (ii) those who are operating on various markets and are 
not looking for certification but will try to comply with 
FLEGT requirements, (iii) those who are operating in a “grey 
area”, pay all taxes but do not comply with the requirements 
of management plans and wood processing (many Asian 
companies), (iv) those who are working on “small titles” and 
are barely complying with the law.
The entrance of the Singapore-based company Olam (a 
conglomerate controlled by Indian businessmen working in 
agri-business rather than forestry) in the forest sector in 
Gabon and the Republic of Congo (buying back the CIB, one 
of the largest FSC certified companies in the world) is sig-
nificant of this shift in power from the European companies 
to the newcomers from emerging countries (Karsenty 2011, 
Cerutti et al. 2011, Putzel et al. 2011). The strategy of these 
profitable conglomerates is to enter sectors where profits used 
to be significant in the past but limited at present (the former 
Danish owner of the CIB recorded financial losses during the 
4 years he owned the company). Questions about the mid-
term intentions of these firms also need attention. Olam, 
which is developing oilpalm and rubberwood plantations 
in Gabon, probably does not plan to earn a lot of money in 
forestry in Central Africa. Controlling a few million hectares 
of land (today forested) might be an advantage for developing 
various types of plantations in the future.
The doublespeak regarding REDD+
REDD+ has been a prominent issue since the mid-2000s 
for the Congo Basin countries. The UN-REDD focused 
especially in the DRC, where the Ministry of Forestry seemed 
to be particularly interested at becoming a regional REDD 
leader. A lot of papers and studies have been produced so 
far – mostly by international consultants – but nothing has 
changed in the field (Brockhaus and Di Grigorio, 2015).
Gabon, Cameron and the Republic of Congo are willing to 
become “emerging” countries at the horizon 2030–2035. 
They are counting on their oil, gas, mineral resources and 
large-scale agribusiness to reach this goal, not on the forests, 
where the potential to generate public revenue through taxes 
is comparatively low. When Gabon, historically one of the 
world largest log exporter, decided to implement a log export 
ban in 2010 (essentially for creating jobs in the wood process-
ing industry), the government accepted the sacrifice of almost 
80% of the forest fiscal revenue (“less than one month of oil 
receipts” said an official at a workshop in 2010). In Camer-
oon, oil palm permits have been granted on forest concessions 
(even on FSC certified ones), the government is reluctant to 
complete the gazetting process of Forest Management Units 
and barely conceals its preference for other land use options 
(Ongolo and Karsenty, 2015), and mines are sometimes dug 
in protected areas (Hoyle and Levang 2012). 
Paradoxically, the deforestation rates in Central Africa 
have slowed by a third between 1990 and 2010, even though 
a recent acceleration is reported by Global Forest Watch20 for 
2013 and 2014 essentially in the DRC. Less than 200,000 ha 
of dense rainforest were lost annually between 2000 and 2010 
compared to almost 300,000 ha in the 1990s (Mayaux et al. 
2013), in spite of the increase of the population. The limited 
if not the absence of public investments in infrastructure and 
agriculture during the decade is probably the main cause of 
this evolution, certainly not the forest-related public policies 
that the governments would have implemented in the name 
of REDD+.
At first, Central African countries hoped they could be 
remunerated under the REDD+ scheme for their “past 
efforts” which they claim to have contributed to conserve the 
forest, thus rendering an “ecosystem service” to the planet. 
They gradually understood that the REDD scheme did not 
allow payments for a “carbon stock”21. Instead, they would 
have to negotiate convenient baseline scenarios in the hope of 
being rewarded for “deforestation below the prediction”. 
COMIFAC proposed an “adjustment factor” that would allow 
Central African countries more deforestation without sacrific-
ing remuneration. The World Bank and the GEF launched 
a sub-regional program for REDD+ preparation, which is 
dedicated to institutional reinforcement and studies. But 
nothing has emerged so far regarding forest-related policies 
(land tenure and land-use planning, energy and transport 
schemes, agriculture policies, population planning, gover-
nance, etc.) or measures needed to curb or contain deforesta-
tion and degradation in the near future.
20
 www.globalforestwatch.org/ 
21
 The principle is to pay for actual reductions against a “business-as-usual” baseline, which means paying for a difference and not for a full 
stock.
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AMBIGUOUS OUTCOMES
Assessing the outcomes of around 15 years of WB endeav-
ours for reforming the forest concession’s regime in Central 
Africa cannot be exempt of controversy. The last example to 
date was provided by the 2013 report of the IEG, which is the 
evaluation team of the World Bank (Evaluation of World 
Bank Group Experience 2013). The evaluation contains 
criticisms against the WB work on “concession reforms in 
tropical moist forest countries with weak governance”22. 
The Guardian summed up the IEG conclusions as follows: 
“The IEG panel (. . .) criticised the bank strongly for: (i) 
Continuing to support industrial logging, (ii) Not involving 
communities in decision-making, (iii) Assuming that benefits 
would accrue to the poor rather than the rich and powerful, 
(iv) Paying little attention to rural poverty” (J. Vidal, 
29/01/2013). All the attention of the observers has been 
caught by two paragraphs related to the West and Central 
Africa WB policies towards concession reform:
“In tropical moist forests in Central and West Africa, 
World Bank support for industrial timber concession 
reforms has helped to advance the rule of law, increase 
transparency and accountability (as compared to the 
“without the Bank” scenario) and put environmental 
standards in place. Evidence is lacking, however, that 
these reforms in tropical moist countries with weak gover-
nance have led to sustainable and inclusive economic 
development. 
Attention to rural poverty has been lacking in World Bank 
supported concession reform projects. World Bank policy 
advice and projects that have supported the reform of 
industrial timber concession regimes have usually 
neglected or underestimated the nontimber values and 
uses of the forests with respect to the livelihoods of forest-
dependent people, their traditional claims, sociocultural 
values, and overall sense of security. Evidence is also 
lacking that concessioned natural forests are being 
managed sustainably”.
Actually, the 2013’s IEG report is walking in the footsteps of 
the 2007’s IP report on DRC. It shares the same beliefs about 
the possibility of an alternative model of forest management 
based on community-based management – even if it is much 
more prudent than the 2007’s IP report about the capacity of 
REDD+ to be instrumental in building such an alternative. It 
is striking that the IEG report did not mention the numerous 
studies that refer to trouble with community forestry in 
Cameroon (Ndanyou and Majerowicz 2004, Vermeulen et al. 
2006, Lescuyer 2007, Julve et al. 2007, Ezzine de Blas et al. 
2009, Cuny 2011, Dehu 2012)23 and suggest that community 
forests in Central Africa are embedded in the governance 
problems of the African States. The functioning of the com-
munity forests is plagued with the difficulties of collective 
action (free riding and accountability) in societies where the 
“exit option”, allowed by the limited density of population, 
has prevented the design of strong collective rules for sustain-
able use of the resources. The IEG report does not mention 
the meta-analysis of the literature by Robinson et al. (2011) 
which shows an “association between negative forest out-
comes and communal land in Africa” (p. 22). 
The IEG report also points out that “By neglecting the 
informal sector, the World Bank has missed an opportunity to 
reach more forest-dependent rural poor, while at the same 
time helping to achieve more environmentally sustainable 
forest management”. This difficulty to deal with the “informal 
sector” has clearly been one of the weaknesses of the WB 
intervention in Central Africa. It is probably not specific 
to the forest sector: the WB is more prepared to talk with 
governments and formal companies than with the informal 
actors of the economy. But the “informalisation” of the forest 
sector is not an exception: the share of informal employment 
in non-agricultural employment, excluding South Africa, rose 
to 78% in sub-Saharan Africa, and is still tending to increase 
(Chen Alter 2008). The avoidance of “formalization” has 
something to do with the “predatory behaviour” of the admin-
istrations that prevent the development of legal small-scale 
enterprises (importance of the “parafiscalité”). But it is also a 
way of coping with social and family pressures for jobs and 
financial aid. Such pressures are pushing the small and 
medium entrepreneurs into informality. Avoiding the creation 
of formal businesses allows them to “pretend to be poor” 
vis-à-vis their entourage (Baland et al. 2011). 
The implicit hypothesis of the WB was that the develop-
ment of community forestry should absorb the chainsaw 
logging activity, resulting in the creation of small-scale 
community enterprises to supply the domestic markets. But 
this did not happen. Chainsaw loggers, often professional 
operators, are more interested in higher quality logs they 
can select wherever they want. When community forests 
are timber-oriented, their production costs are higher than 
the timber costs in informal sector (Lescuyer et al. 2011). 
Community forests’ enterprises prefer exporting rather than 
selling on the domestic market, which pays less. Finally, the 
administrative red tape encumbering the functioning of the 
community forests put hurdles on their legal production. 
Consequently, the needs of the domestic markets are still not 
met by legal timber, but by the informal operators.
22
 A first IEG report prepared in 2008 on the same topic reached quite different conclusions regarding the experience of the WB in reforming 
the concessions. But this report has never been published by the IEG.
23
 The IEG report did not mention any documents written in French. This is a serious weakness for understanding the ins-and-outs of the 
political economy of forestry in French-speaking countries. 
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The predominance of economic approaches over tenure 
and the informal economy issues
Taking a broader perspective, such debates reveal the impor-
tance of the underlying paradigms, especially when evalua-
tions cannot rely on “counterfactuals” (“without the Bank”) 
scenarios, as is often the case in policy evaluations. The WB 
intervention in Central Africa has been shaped by the “eco-
nomics of concessions” debates of the 1990s, using a specific 
“theory of change”. In this theory, what matters for achieving 
SFM was the incentives given by the pricing system (hence, 
the importance given to fiscal studies) and the allocation of 
harvesting rights. The agents who mattered were the conces-
sionaires (including community forestry enterprises) and the 
governments that established the incentives systems. Land 
and forest tenure issues were not disregarded but considered 
as matters to be addressed after the concession regime being 
regulated. Informality was difficult to handle within this 
analytical framework, since the informal actors bypassed the 
regulations whose design is the core of the reform processes. 
Combined with changes in costs of operations and in the 
international timber markets, one of the effects of the changes 
in the forest sector based on the reforms (notably compulsory 
management plans, norms, higher taxes, an auction system 
for permits allocations), has been the double movement of 
concentration (of the export-oriented sector) and fragmenta-
tion (of the domestic-oriented sector) with the expansion of 
the informal sector (Karsenty 2007). This dynamic has been 
overlooked in the “theory of change” of the WB24. 
Poor articulation of the agendas of zoning plans, commu-
nity forestry and small-scale enterprises has been a major 
weakness in WB interventions. Forest sector reforms should 
be conceived and conducted in close connection with evolu-
tions in the legal framework regulating land and tree tenure. 
Providing there is a political will to address also this sensitive 
issue.
Lack or ownership or insufficient capacities to generate 
coalitions? 
WB policies resting on “conditionalities” have been criticized 
for not inducing ownership. This argument is only partly true, 
since it is a common practice for governments to be fully 
part of the reform process (as we have seen in the case of 
Cameroon) but at the same time to argue that they “were 
forced” to adopt measures that hamper their vested interests. 
Nonetheless, Brunner and Ekoko (2000) were right in 
noticing the overly exclusive focus on dialoguing with the 
executive branch of the government. Representatives of the 
parliament have often been neglected – leading to some 
surprises during the legislative process.
The Bank also tended to believe in spontaneous support 
for its actions by local NGOs flagged as “pro-poor”, in favour 
of conservation and local communities. In reality, the eco-
nomic paradigm underlying the WB’s “theory of change” is 
generally not well understood by the local NGOs. In Camer-
oon, many NGOs opposed the auction system for concessions 
on the grounds that it would favour wealthy foreign operators 
over national ones25. The Bank probably relied too much on 
the relationships established with key members of govern-
ments and it neglected creating coalitions for introducing 
reforms that included large parts of the civil society and the 
parliamentarians. Changes in governmental coalitions due 
to changes in the ministries’ senior staff have often been 
synonymous to loss of leverage for reform processes. 
The way forward: rewarding or investing? 
REDD+ as a “performance-based” payment scheme is 
particularly appealing for donors since it relies on financial 
incentives but does not need any “conditionalities”: the gov-
ernments are completely sovereign in deciding on the means 
and policies they will implement for curbing deforestation. 
In principle, donors are in a more comfortable position: they 
just have to invest upfront for institutional building, and “the 
carbon market” will reward ex post for the “performance” 
reached (by comparing against a baseline scenario). The com-
plex task of designing policies and verifying the implementa-
tion of the reforms are no longer the business of the donors, 
who, thus, can position themselves as mere lenders for the 
countries seeking to take advantage of the carbon market. 
Beyond the question of how to fabricate the “perfor-
mance” from scratch (Karsenty 2008), the difficulty with a 
Central African country is that the governments seem more 
interested in large-scale investments they can attract for 
agriculture, mining and infrastructure than in undertaking the 
(socially) costly reforms that would be required to conserve 
their forests. And, assuming that these countries had the will 
to really take action to protect their forests, most countries– 
starting with the DRC – simply do not have the institutions 
needed to design and implement ambitious transformations, 
such as a land tenure reform or new agriculture policies. 
Donors will have to invest heavily and over a long haul not 
only in institution-building, they will also have to participate 
in designing the reforms they will be requested to sponsor, at 
least partly. 
Whatever the likelihood of a future REDD+ scheme deliv-
ering offsets for the international carbon markets, it seems 
more and more evident that the public funding associated 
with REDD+ will have to be sustained and probably increased 
through time. This will be to give the poorest countries the 
financial means needed to address the domestic drivers of 
deforestation and to pay for the reforms of forest-related 
24
 The Voluntary Partnership Agreements between the EU and exporting countries implemented under the FLEGT initiative will probably 
reinforce this tendency.
25
 To prevent this, some concessions were reserved for bidding between national loggers only. The Government eventually decided to put an 
end to this exception.
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policies that are critical for tackling the issue. Phase II of 
REDD+ is designed along those lines and the recent Central 
African Forest Initiative (CAFI) is to be seen in this perspec-
tive. It is unlikely that most of the countries can move quickly 
to Phase III, which is performance-based. “Investing” will 
be the key word for long to come, the “reward” dimension 
remaining a possible feature of the REDD+ mechanism once 
the numerous difficulties (additionality of the reductions, 
risks of leakage, permanence issue, side-effects on biodiver-
sity, opposition of social NGOs, etc.) have been overcome. 
And as long as public aid for investment is concerned, donors 
will want to monitor the effective and equitable use of their 
money. In the end, with the exception of some emerging 
countries such as Brazil that might have the capacity to fund 
their reforms themselves, the REDD+ public sponsors will 
be facing the same issues as the WB faced in Central Africa 
during its “forest policy reform” years. Rather than uncondi-
tional reward once the “performance” has been monitored, 
i.e., achieved, as is often expected from REDD+, condition-
alities that orient the sponsors’ investments will be the corner-
stone in the decision to invest public funds for implementing 
forest-related policies.
CONCLUSION 
To qualify the situation prevailing in the forest sector in 
Central Africa, it is not uncommon to hear that the regulatory 
framework is globally suitable, but the implementation is fail-
ing due to a lack of political will and limited effectiveness of 
the public institutions. Even though the framework still needs 
many improvements, this statement accurately summarizes 
the achievements and limitations of the reform processes in 
Central Africa during the two last decades. 
The issue of ownership, and more precisely in-depth and 
sustained ownership of the reform processes, remains central. 
But this issue goes well beyond the commitments of the Pres-
ident, the Minister of Forests and a small group of high-level 
officials. Increasing transparency and accountability jeopar-
dizes vested interests entrenched in the public administration. 
These interests have the capacity to resist silently and to 
undermine the reform processes from the inside. On the other 
hand, convincing the public opinion of the benefits of the 
reforms for more equity and effectiveness is a key achieve-
ment when hoping to circumvent the passive resistance in the 
inner circles of the public administration. The WB probably 
did not pay enough attention to the in-depth work that needed 
to be done with journalists, leaders of associations, parlia-
mentarians and academics, to explain the ins-and-outs of the 
reform processes26. As for the NGOs, it is not enough to 
“bring them on board” through consulting contracts as it tried 
to do. Providing training for their members – especially in 
economics and forest ecology/management and institutional 
change – would be extremely useful to developing a shared 
understanding of the stakes associated with the reform 
processes. 
Another dimension that is critical for the reform processes 
is enhancing the rule of law through accountability, down-
ward accountability from the public administration to the 
citizens and from the citizens who hold the public administra-
tion accountable. This would help in sustaining the reform 
processes, regardless of changes at the top echelons of the 
ministries. Checks-and-balances in institutional functioning 
can be encouraged through support to parliamentarians and 
citizens’ associations tasked to investigate and report publicly 
on the implementation of the rule of law. In 2005, the publica-
tion of the Lutundula report27 on the irregularities in the 
mining contracts granted to companies in DRC, was instru-
mental in raising the awareness of Congolese citizens to the 
importance of what was at stake in the concession allocation 
process in the mining sector. 
The ultimate challenge for donors and committed govern-
ments will be to shift from the traditional approach in terms 
of national public forest policies to a new paradigm in terms 
of the coherence of forest-related policies (Singer 2008); this 
includes all the public and private policies that affect forests, 
directly and indirectly (land tenure, agriculture, transports, 
land-use planning, energy policies, etc. see Lele et al. 2013). 
The new paradigm does not only concern forest-related poli-
cies in developing countries, but also policies and consump-
tion patterns in industrial countries, as was recently pointed 
out regarding the significant impact of EU policies and con-
sumption patterns on deforestation (European Commission 
2013)28. The limited capacity to take action beyond tradition-
al sectoral boundaries is a traditional weakness of both the 
organizations and the ministries in developing countries. 
But, if tropical deforestation is to be reduced or contained, 
coherent cross-sectoral policies coupled with responsible 
trade and consumption policies in developed countries, will 
be essential.
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